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On October 10, 1918, four days before United States v. Jacob Abrams
went to trial, the government petitioned to sever the case against Jacob
Schwartz and proceed against the remaining defendants without him.1
Schwartz lay feverish in jail, a casualty of the influenza pandemic that
had swept through the overcrowded and windowless cells of the
Manhattan prison known as the Tombs.2 Fellow radicals attributed his
susceptibility to the disease to a severe beating that he allegedly
suffered under interrogation for his role in protesting the deployment
of American troops to the Soviet Union.3 Soon after Judge Henry D.
Clayton Jr. granted the government’s motion, Schwartz was transferred
to the prison ward at Bellevue, though the hospital was already at
double its capacity and the morgue had run out of room.4 Three days
later, Schwartz succumbed to pneumonia. “The hospital records state
that he died of Spanish influenza,” a pamphlet urging a general amnesty
for wartime “political prisoners” relayed, “but his comrades insist that
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1 Transcript of Record at 20–21, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (No.
316) [hereinafter Transcript of Record].
2 RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE
SPEECH 91 (1987).
3 Id. at 88–95.
4 Id. at 91.
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he was killed by police brutality.”5 His death spared him the twentyyear prison terms that were meted out to most of his alleged coconspirators. At sentencing, defendant Samuel Lipman reflected that he
paid dearly for his commitment to the truth, though not as dearly as
Schwartz, who had paid with his life.6
The centennial of the Supreme Court’s decision in Abrams v. United
States has occasioned myriad tributes to the birth of the modern First
Amendment. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s testament to the “free
trade in ideas” has been exalted for its soaring rhetoric as well as its
penetrating distillation of the value of open debate.7 In the conventional
account, Abrams marked a fateful and fundamental turning point.
Before it, judges and juries capitulated to patriotic pressures and
accepted the suppression of disfavored ideas as a cost of public safety or
of majoritarian democracy. After it, pioneering jurists came to recognize
that “time has upset many fighting faiths,” and they joined a handful of
progressive scholars in erecting judicial enforcement of the First
Amendment as a barrier against government overreach.8 The Abrams
dissent, in short, is a cornerstone of the American free speech tradition.
The thrust of this essay is to suggest that the Abrams dissent was
somewhat less momentous than it has been made out to be—or at least,
that the case for its greatness is more attenuated than has traditionally
been understood. The essay begins with a brief description of the social
and political climate that shaped the prosecution and that eventually
informed the justices’ resolution of the case. It then turns to the early
5 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS PRISON 14
(1919). Even sympathetic contemporaries were divided over whether the injuries
Schwartz sustained during the interrogation were causally linked to his death, given that
Schwartz also had an underlying heart condition. Id. at 10; see also Zechariah Chafee Jr.,
A Contemporary State Trial—The United States Versus Jacob Abrams et al, 33 HARV. L. REV.
747, 762 (1920).
6 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 30.
7 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The
dissent has been described as “glorious.” See, for example, 1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES &
HAROLD J. LASKI, HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
HAROLD J. LASKI 222 (1928); FLOYD ABRAMS, FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT LINES WITH
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 412 (2013). On Holmes’s use of the market metaphor, see Vincent
Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 6–13; C. Edwin Baker,
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974–78 (1978).
8 Id. For accounts tracing the modern First Amendment to the Espionage Act
prosecutions and the Holmes and Brandeis dissents, see, for example, LEE C. BOLLINGER &
GEOFFREY R. STONE, THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY (2019); MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE
SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 2 (1991); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE
MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS FROM WILSON TO FDR 8–9
(1972); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1 (1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM 230 (2004).
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reception of the Supreme Court’s decision and Justice Holmes’s fabled
dissent among legal scholars and advocates. In so doing, it offers a fuller
picture of the perceived significance of the case when it was decided and
of the unfamiliar and often counterintuitive uses to which the majority
and dissenting opinions were put.
Abrams indeed coincided with a wave of critical commentary
among liberals who had previously accepted the suppression of antiwar
expression. It is also true that Justice Holmes’s dissent was widely
disseminated in radical newspapers and the mainstream press. Yet the
import of the decision was not its interpretation of the First
Amendment, much less a wholesale reimagining of the judicial role. In
the immediate aftermath of the decision, legal scholars found Holmes’s
doctrinal analysis in dissent to be bemusing and inconsistent. Some
thought his departure from the majority opinion was narrowly confined,
a disagreement about fact more than law or statutory more than
constitutional interpretation; others treated his apparent about-face as
an artifact of its timing, removed as it was from the exigencies of war,
and thus a misapplication of his emerging “clear and present danger”
test.9 Justice John Hessin Clarke, who wrote the majority opinion, was
no paragon of judicial conservatism. As Herbert Goodrich observed in
the Michigan Law Review in 1921, “[d]espite the fact that the judges
disagreed, it is difficult to put a finger on the exact difference between
majority and minority as to the law.”10
In short, in the months after Abrams was decided, hardly anyone
imagined the dissent as a harbinger of aggressive First Amendment
review of convictions for seditious activity, let alone judicial invalidation
of democratically enacted laws. As I have argued elsewhere, it would
take at least another decade for that decidedly modern understanding
of the First Amendment to take root.11 Still, there is no doubt that the
Abrams dissent was an important and enduring one. The themes that
Abrams pushed into the public spotlight are every bit as relevant as the
ones that have been thrust on the decision retroactively.
In the wake of the Abrams case, liberals and radicals deployed
Justice Holmes’s dissent to generate publicity for a national amnesty of
all prisoners who had been prosecuted during the war for their
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.”).
10 Herbert F. Goodrich, Does the Constitution Protect Free Speech, 19 MICH. L. REV. 487,
493 (1921).
11 See generally LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES
COMPROMISE (2016).
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unorthodox beliefs.12 They invoked Abrams as a cautionary tale about
the susceptibility of illiberal laws to misapplication and abuse, and they
urged legislators and public officials to exercise restraint and to model
broad-mindedness and tolerance. They held out treatment of the
defendants as evidence of longstanding complaints about police
brutality and inhumane prison conditions in a period of profound
economic inequality, labor unrest, hostility to immigration, and the
uncertainty of a global pandemic.
What the Abrams dissent did not do, however, was provoke an
immediate reevaluation among progressives of the judicial enforcement
of “constitutional limitations,” even in the domain of personal rights.13
On the contrary, it exacerbated progressive concerns about juror bias,
disproportionate sentencing, and weak or vindictive judges. Indeed, it
buttressed the belief among many of Justice Holmes’s most stalwart
supporters that something must be done to cabin the power of the
courts.
I. THE ABRAMS TRIAL AND THE AMBIT OF WARTIME SUPPRESSION
In the summer of 1918, Jacob Abrams, Hyman Lachowsky, Samuel
Lipman, Jacob Schwartz, and Mollie Steimer gathered in Harlem to
commiserate over American military interference in Soviet Russia and
to devise an appropriate response.14 Abrams, Lachowsky, and Schwartz
worked as bookbinders. Lipman was a furrier, and Steimer worked in a
shirtwaist factory. All five—four of whom were professed anarchists,
and the fifth, Lipman, a socialist—were among the nearly half-million
Russian Jews who arrived in the United States in the five years before
Europe was plunged into war.15 None had applied for naturalization.
For the time being, all welcomed the Bolshevik Revolution as the
realization of their idealistic ambitions for radical political and
economic change.16

12

See generally POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5.
The then-prevailing term for judicial review was most closely associated with
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1st ed. 1868).
14 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 41–42.
15 Id. at 4–11 (providing a detailed account of the defendants and of the events
leading up to the arrests).
16 By the time the defendants were deported to the Soviet Union in November 1921,
Steimer (and many other anarchists) had soured on the Revolution. See, e.g., Girl Won’t
Accept Deportation Offer, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1921 (“Steimer, who thinks the experiences
of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman is evidence that anarchists have a hard time
in Russia, refuses to consent [to deportation].”).
13
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The group resolved to purchase a printing press and distribute
pamphlets urging American workers to support the revolution. The
resulting leaflets decried President Woodrow Wilson’s decision to
dispatch American troops to Vladivostok, Russia. Although Wilson had
issued a statement disclaiming intervention in Russia’s “internal
affairs,” the troops were deployed alongside the Allied expeditions that
were assisting the anti-Communist White Russians in their struggle
against the Bolsheviks.17 That decision was premised on alleged Soviet
support for Germany, a justification that American radicals (and most
subsequent historians) dismissed as a pretext.18 Incensed by the
perceived betrayal, Lipman prepared an English circular that
condemned Wilson as a “coward” who was unwilling to admit openly
that “capitalistic nations cannot afford to have a proletarian republic in
Russia.”19 He denounced capitalism as the “enemy of the workers of the
world” and called upon Russian emigrants to “Rise!” and to “Put down
your enemy and mine!”20 A separate Yiddish pamphlet written by
Schwartz went further. It urged the workers to “spit in the face [of] the
false, hypocritic, military propaganda,” warning that liberty loans were
funding the production of bullets that were used against Soviet workers,
and that “[w]orkers in the ammunition factories” were churning out
weapons to “murder . . . your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are
fighting for freedom.”21 In an unguarded call to action, the pamphlet
boldly declared that “our reply to the barbaric intervention has to be a
general strike!”22 It enjoined “all rulers” to remember “that the hand of
the revolution will not shiver in a fight.”23
In August, with the assistance of a sympathetic acquaintance,
Hyman Rosansky, who later disclosed their identities to the authorities,
Lachowsky and Steimer distributed thousands of copies of the leaflets
in the streets of New York.24 Along with Abrams, Lipman, and Schwartz,
they were arrested and charged with violation of the 1917 Espionage
Act and its 1918 (Sedition Act) amendments. Attorney Harry
17

See GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE DECISION TO INTERVENE, in SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS,
1917–1920, 482–85 (Princeton Univ. Press 1989) (1958).
18 See POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 117.
19 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 16.
20 Id. at 17.
21 Id. at 18–19.
22 Id. at 19.
23 Id. The English translation of the Yiddish pamphlet quoted here, which was
entered into evidence in the trial, contained some errors. See POLENBERG, supra note 2,
at 51–53.
24 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618 (1919). Rosansky attracted attention
by throwing the pamphlets from a high window, which prompted the inquiry and
subsequent arrests. See id.
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Weinberger, a seasoned veteran of constitutional contestation over
repressive wartime legislation, defended all of them in the Southern
District of New York and on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.
In October 1918, a jury swiftly and unanimously convicted them.25 One
year later, a seven-justice majority of the Supreme Court upheld their
convictions in Abrams v. United States.26
As the Abrams case wound its way through the courts, the United
States was on the brink of transition from “war hysteria” to “Red
hysteria.”27 The conversion was a matter of degree rather than kind.
Since its entry into World War I in the spring of 1917, the country had
been swept up in jingoistic repression. Public officials and ordinary
Americans had closed ranks to stomp out interference with the nation’s
war aims and the tools of military mobilization, including industrial
production and conscription.28 The Committee on Public Information
had worked to boost support for the war effort, while Congress dutifully
enacted legislation to criminalize opposition.29 From the outset, such
laws were invoked not only against pro-German propaganda but also
against the disaffected radicals who regarded the conflict as a
concession to Wall Street profiteers.30 Although officials brushed off
allegations that they were “us[ing] the war as a means to crush labor,”31
critics were quick to point out how many of the most prominent
Espionage Act prosecutions had targeted radical defendants. The
25 For a comprehensive account of the trial, see POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 82–117.
A seventh defendant and friend of Abrams’s, Gabriel Prober, was not involved in printing
or distributing the leaflets and was found not guilty.
26 On the Supreme Court’s decision, see generally POLENBERG, supra note 2; THOMAS
HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED
THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013).
27 See The Red Hysteria, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 28, 1920, at 249–53. See generally Laura
Weinrib, Against Intolerance: The Red Scare Roots of Legal Liberalism, 18 J. GILDED AGE &
PROGRESSIVE ERA 7 (2019).
28 See CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN 7–11 (2008); DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD
WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 45–59 (1980).
29 On the Committee on Public Information, see ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICA’S GREAT
WAR: WORLD WAR I AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 78–84 (2000); see also STEPHEN VAUGHN,
HOLDING FAST THE INNER LINES: DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM, AND THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION (1980).
30 The targets included socialists and the Industrial Workers of the World (“IWW”).
See, for example, MICHAEL KAZIN, WAR AGAINST WAR: THE AMERICAN FIGHT FOR PEACE,
1914–1918 (2017); C. ROLAND MARCHAND, THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL
REFORM, 1889–1918 244–48 (1972); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN AMERICA,
1912–1925 ch. 3 (1967).
31 Resolution, in Am. Civil Liberties Union Records, The Roger Baldwin Years,
1917–1950 vol. 3, 109 [hereinafter ACLU Papers] (on file with Princeton University
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Public Policy Papers).
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casualties included practically the entire leadership of the Industrial
Workers of the World (“IWW”), along with socialists Charles Schenck
and Eugene V. Debs.32
With few exceptions, convictions under the wartime legislation
were practically pro forma.33 One of the first important cases raised
hopes among radical defendants that judges might exercise moderation.
When the Postmaster General attempted to shut down The Masses, a
respected socialist magazine, the Civil Liberties Bureau of the American
Union Against Militarism (AUAM) organized a defense fund, and lawyer
Gilbert Roe represented the publication and its staff.34 Antiwar activists
and radical dissenters were heartened when Judge Learned Hand
decided, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that suppressing The
Masses because of its antiwar editorials and political cartoons exceeded
the authority conferred on postal officials under the Espionage Act.35
Eschewing the oft-invoked “bad tendency” test that held speakers
accountable under the wartime legislation for statements likely to lead
to prohibited conduct, Judge Hand would have required direct
incitement to violation of the law as a condition of conviction under the
statute.36 Encouraged by his opinion, the Civil Liberties Bureau (which
soon reorganized as the National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB) and
would eventually become the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU))
launched a national network of lawyers willing to represent defendants
in Espionage Act and conscription cases.37 In November, however, the
32 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919). On the suppression of the IWW and socialists, see MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE
SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD 376–97, 438–531 (1969);
WILLIAM PRESTON JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903–1933
88–117 (1963).
33 The few exceptions include Judges George M. Borquin and Charles Fremont
Amidon. There were also some early victories under the Trading with the Enemy Acts
as well as local ordinances and state laws. On the whole, however, judges capitulated to
popular pressures. See PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES 179–247 (1979); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the “Bad Tendency”
Test: Free Speech in Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 415–19 (2002).
34 The Masses was edited by Max Eastman, whose sister, Crystal Eastman, had served
as executive secretary of the American Union Against Militarism and was a co-founder
of the National Civil Liberties Bureau.
35 Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d
Cir. 1917). Judge Hand’s opinion in Masses does not contain the terms “First
Amendment” or “Constitution.”
36 On the Masses case, see GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE
(1994); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975).
37 On the NCLB and early ACLU, see generally ROBERT C. COTTRELL, ROGER NASH
BALDWIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2000); DONALD JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO
AMERICAN FREEDOMS: WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
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Second Circuit reversed Judge Hand’s decision, and The Masses, which
lost its second-class mailing privileges, had no choice except to shut
down.38 Other courts proved equally obliging of the administration’s
speech-suppressive agenda.
Litigation under the Selective Service Act, passed in May 1917
despite significant opposition, fared even worse.39 Officials were
confident that “every possible legal contingency was cared for” and that
a constitutional challenge to conscription was bound to fail.40 When the
Supreme Court considered a spate of convictions under the statute in
December, the Solicitor General deemed the defendants’ claims
“frivolous” and thought it practically unnecessary to “appear and refute
them.”41 It was Harry Weinberger, future lawyer for the Abrams
defendants, who represented famed anarchists Alexander Berkman and
Emma Goldman in the conscription case.42 Weinberger was a pacifist
and radical individualist who had worked closely with the prewar Free
Speech League and categorically opposed state interference with
personal liberties, from compulsory vaccination to birth control
regulation.43 He was also an enthusiastic member of Goldman and
Berkman’s No-Conscription League, which was organized in opposition
to conscription on grounds of internationalism, anti-militarism, and
anti-capitalism.44
In the spring, Weinberger had approached future NCLB (and ACLU)
co-founder Roger Baldwin to propose the creation of an American Legal
Defense League to “fight all cases in the United States where free speech,
free press or the right peaceably to assemble or to petition the

(1963); SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990);
WEINRIB, supra note 11; JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES
OF AMERICAN LAW ch. 3 (2007).
38 Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 39 (2d Cir. 1917).
39 Selective Service Act, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917); Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217
(1917). See, e.g., Anti-Registration Pleas Are Ruled Out by Tuttle, July 11, 1917
(newspaper clipping), in ACLU Papers, supra note 31, vol. 46; Broke Draft Law, Get Long
Terms, N.Y. WORLD, Dec. 18, 1917, in ACLU Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 46; Detroit
Socialist Given Year in Jail for Not Registering, N.Y. CALL, Nov. 25, 1917, in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, at vol. 46.
40 Doubts Court Test of the Draft Law, July 22, 1917 (newspaper clipping), in ACLU
Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 43.
41 Argument Ended in Draft Appeals, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 14, 1917.
42 Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiffs-in-Error at 25–78, Goldman and Berkman v. United
States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (No. 702) (arguing that the “Draft Act is unconstitutional”).
43 See POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 75–78; WALKER, supra note 37, at 22. On the Free
Speech League, see generally RABBAN, supra note 8.
44 Transcript of Record at 114, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918) (No.
656) (quoting Manifesto of the No-Conscription League (May 25, 1917)).
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government is invaded.”45 Although Baldwin instead opted to build a
new organization for the defense of personal rights within the AUAM,46
Weinberger’s advice helped to shape the agenda of the NCLB and
constitutional litigation under the wartime legislation more broadly.
Weinberger believed that the publication of pamphlets critical of the
government and military practices was protected by the First
Amendment,47 and he was determined to “re-educate the people, that
they have the right to discuss and the right to oppose conscription and
ask for its repeal.”48 The short-lived American Legal Defense League
initially attracted support from notable progressives, along with the
New Republic.49 Even the Secretary of War signaled acceptance, if not
encouragement, of its program.50
In practice, however, Weinberger’s legal arguments quickly
alienated mainstream sympathizers. Challenging the constitutionality
of the Selective Service Act, he argued that the statute’s narrowly
defined exemptions for particular religious sects violated the
Establishment Clause and infringed on religious liberty by inhibiting
individual religious choice.51 He went so far as to defend an anarchist’s
right to refuse to register out of opposition to “uniformed murder” in a
war “waged by governments,”52 insisting that “the protection of the
Constitution . . . is guaranteed to all.”53 Predictably, such claims found
little traction in the courts. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Supreme
Court “pass[ed] without anything but statement the proposition that an
establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise
thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption
clauses of the act,” because it considered the “unsoundness” of the

45 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger N. Baldwin (Apr. 28, 1917), in ACLU
Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 35.
46 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Harry Weinberger (June 18, 1917), in ACLU
Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 35.
47 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger N. Baldwin (Apr. 30, 1917), in ACLU
Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 35.
48 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Joy Young (May 2, 1917), in ACLU Papers, supra
note 31, at vol. 35.
49 See Defense of Free Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 12, 1917, at 54; The American Legal
Defense League, NATION, May 31, 1917.
50 Secretary of War Denounces Military Rowdyism—Militarism the Same the World
Over, LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN & ENGINEMEN’S MAG., July 15, 1917, at 4 (quoting Letter from
Newton Baker to Harry Weinberger).
51 Transcript of Record at 5–6, Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (No.
681). Among other claims, he argued that conscription violated the Thirteenth
Amendment.
52 Id. at 23.
53 Id. at 34.
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argument “too apparent to require” further discussion.54 In upholding
the Selective Service Act, the Court stressed the expansive scope of
federal powers when the nation was at war.
Formidable as the existing tools of state-coerced conformity
proved to be, authorities clamored for more. In May 1918, Congress
debated the infamous Sedition Act amendments to the Espionage Act.
The Sedition Act directly prohibited “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or
abusive language about the form of Government of the United States,”
along with the Constitution, the Armed Forces, and the American flag.55
It also criminalized advocacy of “any curtailment of production in this
country” of anything “necessary . . . to the prosecution of the war . . . with
intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the
prosecution of the war.”56 Violations of these provisions were
punishable by twenty years in prison and a $10,000 fine.57 In contrast
to other wartime measures, the bill provoked a spirited debate within
and outside Congress. Several legislators stressed the potential for
bureaucratic overreach and even partisan abuse, especially in the
absence of a statutory safe harbor for truthful criticism. Nonetheless,
the bill passed easily, and on May 16, President Wilson happily signed it
into law.58 The Abrams defendants were acutely aware of the new “gag
act” and the twenty-year prison term that attached to violations, as
Mollie Steimer admitted to the officers who arrested her.59 In fact
Lipman’s leaflet expressly “denounc[ed] German militarism” in what
was presumably a conscious effort to escape liability under the statute.60
As events unfolded, Lipman’s disclaimer proved woefully
insufficient. True, officials within the Department of Justice (belatedly)
rejected the theory that criticizing the American intervention in Russia,

54

Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1918).
Sedition Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 On the terms of the Sedition Act and debate over its passage, see STONE, supra note
8, at 183–91; JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 97–98; MURPHY, supra note 33, at 81, 98–103;
and RABBAN, supra note 8, at 250–55.
59 See Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 83; Two Justices Refuse to Gag
Pamphleteers, N.Y. CALL, Nov. 12, 1919 (referring to “gag act”). Steimer was asked
whether she knew “at the time [she] distributed these pamphlets that it was a violation
of the law.” Id. She replied, “Yes, sir . . . I read in the newspapers that the Espionage Law
had passed, and it said that anyone who attacked the United States or who speaks
against the uniform of the United States Army or Navy [or] insults the President . . .
would get twenty years in prison.” Id. Abrams, by contrast, testified that he “thought
[he] broke no law,” because his criticism of the President was protected “under the
constitutional right of free speech.” Id. at 174.
60 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 17.
55
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without more, was sufficient to constitute an Espionage Act violation.61
At the same time, they were persuaded that Schwartz’s Yiddish
pamphlet crossed the line by calling explicitly for a general strike to
hamper military production.62 It did not help matters that Abrams
presented a forged draft card when he was first apprehended, nor that
several of the defendants possessed loaded revolvers.63 Among the
many Espionage Act convictions eventually affirmed by the Supreme
Court, the Abrams case was a poor bet to break the Court’s unanimity.
The indictment against the Abrams defendants tracked the
language of the Sedition Act. Its first three counts charged the
defendants with conspiring, while the United States was at war with
Germany, “to unlawfully utter, print, write and publish,” first, “disloyal,
scurrilous and abusive language about the form of Government of the
United States”; second, “language ‘intended to bring the form of
Government of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, and
disrepute’”; and third, “language ‘intended to incite, provoke and
encourage resistance to the United States in said war.’”64 The fourth
count charged the defendants with conspiring “unlawfully and willfully,
by utterance, writing, printing and publication, to urge, incite and
advocate curtailment of production of . . . ordnance and ammunition”
essential to the ongoing war.65
Given the crowded docket in the Southern District of New York, the
case was assigned to a visiting judge from Alabama, Henry DeLamar
Clayton, Jr. Although he was best known as sponsor of the Clayton
Antitrust Act, with its conspicuous exemption for organized labor, Judge
Clayton was an unfortunate selection for the Abrams defendants. An
unabashed white supremacist, he despised revolutionaries and German
sympathizers in equal measure.66 He was also decidedly unlikely to
accept Weinberger’s invitation to invalidate the Sedition Act on First
Amendment grounds. Judge Clayton believed courts “could not make
the law,” but rather were “bound by its limitations.”67 At the same time,
he was unsympathetic to attacks on judicial review, and he rejected
prewar efforts to limit judicial power through the “recall of judges and
61

POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 74.
Id.
63 Id. at 48–49.
64 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S 616, 617 (1919).
65 Id. The complete indictment appears at Transcript of Record, supra note 1,
at 2–15.
66 On Clayton, see POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 95–104, and Paul M. Pruitt, Jr., Henry
D. Clayton: Plantation Progressive on the Federal Bench, in PAUL M. PRUITT & GUY W. HUBBS,
ED., TAMING ALABAMA: LAWYERS AND REFORMERS, 1804–1929 (2010).
67 Henry D. Clayton, Popularizing Administration of Justice, 8 A.B.A. J. 43, 43 (1922).
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judicial decisions” as misguided—though he thought that modest
reform directed toward making the law less technical and more
accessible would block the spread, and perhaps even “wholly destroy[],”
the twin scourges of Bolshevism and socialism that the war had
unleashed on America.68
Predictably, Judge Clayton denied
Weinberger’s motions to dismiss the indictments on the grounds that
the Espionage Act was unconstitutionally vague and inconsistent with
the First Amendment.69 On October 14, a jury was empaneled, and
United States v. Abrams went to trial.
From Harry Weinberger’s perspective, the trial offered several
important opportunities. As with other wartime cases, Weinberger
sought to impugn the constitutionality of the Espionage and Sedition
acts and to promote the cause of free speech. He likened the defendants
to such martyrs to freedom as Socrates, John Brown, Elijah Lovejoy, and
above all to Jesus70—a comparison that Abrams had drawn as well and
which bothered Judge Clayton just as much as Abrams’s reference to his
“forefathers” who had built America on revolution.71
Yet to Weinberger, the Abrams trial was about much more than
expressive freedom. First and foremost, it was a chance to defend
radical advocacy by “putting on the witness-stand men of national
reputation” who would discredit American intervention in the Soviet
Union.72 To that end, Weinberger hoped to elicit testimony from
Raymond Robins, a former head of the American Red Cross in Russia,
who believed that American intervention in the Soviet Union was
premised on misinformation. Weinberger planned to question Robins
about the so-called “Sisson documents” purportedly linking Bolshevik
Russia to the Kaiser, which Wilson invoked to justify the deployment of
American troops (and which were widely disseminated by the
Committee on Public Information). Robins had been silenced by
government officials; subpoenaed to testify in court, he would have had
no choice but to acknowledge publicly his conviction that the documents

68

Id.
At trial and in his briefs, Weinberger argued that the Sedition Act was
unconstitutional because it was “too uncertain and inexact as to what act or acts are
prohibited by it.” Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 260. Vagueness claims had been
pursued with some success in other contexts, and Alexander Bickel would later praise
vagueness doctrine for its deference to the legislative process. See Alexander M. Bickel,
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 63
(1961). Perhaps, had the Court accepted Weinberger’s argument, 1920s progressives
might have endorsed it for the same reason, but the Court declined the invitation.
70 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 21–24.
71 See Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 194.
72 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 12.
69
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were forgeries.73 Weinberger hoped the revelation would embarrass
the Wilson administration and erode support for America’s military
presence in Russia, but his aspirations in that regard were thwarted.
Judge Clayton cut off all questioning about the legality and wisdom of
President Wilson’s decision to dispatch troops to Siberia.74
For Weinberger, the Abrams trial was also an occasion to build
support for a general amnesty of all individuals convicted under the
wartime legislation. To that end, he drew attention to officials’
aggressive investigative methods. The so-called third degree was a
staple of interrogation in early twentieth-century New York, and the
defendants had described the use of chilling tactics, “from tearing the
hair to pulling the tongue; from black-jacks to the leg of a chair.”75 In
early September, Schwartz had written in a letter that the arrest “could
be compared with the Spanish Inquisition and the blackest pages of
man’s brutality to man.”76 Weinberger sought repeatedly to elicit
corroborating testimony from the officers,77 but all denied engaging in
abuse.78
Weinberger also provided the defendants a platform for explaining
their actions and aspirations, along with their economic theories.
Abrams admitted to being a “revolutionist” and forthrightly declared
that he did not “believe in government.”79 Mollie Steimer, a “youthful
and diminutive radical” who (according to the New York Times) defied
“all laws and authorities,”80 testified extensively and unabashedly about
the ills of capitalist exploitation. She baldly declared that she did not
“believe in such laws” as the Sedition Act and was “trying to defeat”
them.81 As for the probable effect of a general strike in the munitions
factory on the prosecution of the war against Germany, she answered
only that she “cared nothing about interfering with the war with
Germany, because it does not matter to me.”82
73

See POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 108–16.
He allowed Weinberger to read his questions into the record but did not permit
the witness to answer them. See Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 123–33.
75 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 11 (quoting Letter from
Jacob Schwartz to Dear Comrades (Sept. 5, 1918)).
76 Id.
77 Five Bolsheviki Guilty, One Freed of Attacking U.S., N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1918, at 14.
78 Polenberg concludes that the anarchists’ accounts of the abuse, which were
reported immediately and were internally consistent, were likely accurate. POLENBERG,
supra note 2, at 67–68.
79 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 164.
80 Sentences of Mollie Steimer and Three Co-Plotters Cut to 2½ Years by President, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1921.
81 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 219.
82 Id. at 222.
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In short, it was evident from the outset that the “five Bolsheviki,” as
the New York Tribune called the defendants, had “scant hope of
acquittal.”83 That was especially true in light of Judge Clayton’s
demeanor in conducting the trial, an issue that attracted considerable
attention from scholars and advocates in the coming months. Clayton
suggested to the jury that the defendants’ secrecy betokened illicit
intentions, and he intimated that conviction would be appropriate on
the basis of their testimony alone.84 The New York Tribune reported that
Abrams’s testimony “so aroused the court that Judge Clayton conducted
a cross-examination of his own.”85 He interrupted, spoke over, and
ridiculed the witnesses, according to the prosecution-friendly New York
Times.86
Against this backdrop, the swift convictions of the Abrams
defendants were unremarkable. The jury deliberated for a little over an
hour before finding Abrams, Steimer, Lachowsky, Lipman, and
Rosansky guilty on all four counts.87 Given the rate of convictions in
Espionage Act cases, neither Weinberger nor the defendants could have
considered the verdict surprising; convictions were routinely obtained
for much milder remarks under the much narrower provisions of the
original Espionage Act.88 More jarring, however, were the unusually
long sentences that Clayton meted out. In exchange for cooperating
with the government, Rosansky received only three years in prison. The
others were sentenced to twenty, except Steimer who, in an apparently
paternalistic concession to her gender, received only fifteen.89 Like his
fellow defendants, Lipman professed to welcome the news. He
expressed his hope that the trial would “go on record as a trial not of the
United States Government against five individuals, but as a trial of
83

Five Bolsheviki Guilty, One Freed of Attacking U.S., N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1918.
See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 237. (“It is perhaps not amiss for
me to say that men who are actuated by pure and lawful motives as a rule act in the open
daylight. . . . So it is proper for you to consider how these leaflets were printed and how
they were circulated, as bearing upon the question of the intent that animated these
defendants in the circulation of those leaflets.”).
85 Thousands of Anarchists Here Still Active, Defendant Asserts, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 22,
1918. See also Chafee, supra note 5, at 756 (“[I]t is one of the remarkable features of this
case that most of the cross-examination of the prisoners was not by the district attorney
but by the court . . . .”).
86 Bolshevist Witness Curbed by Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1918.
87 Five Bolsheviki Guilty, One Freed of Attacking U.S., N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1918. The jury
acquitted Prober, whom the government had failed to link to the distribution of the
pamphlets. Id. See generally Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 240.
88 For representative examples, see STONE, supra note 8, at 171–73.
89 See Mollie Steimer and 3 Youths to Be Released, N.Y. CALL, Oct. 16, 1921; see also
Prison Terms for the Bolsheviki, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 26, 1918 (“The sentences are the most
severe inflicted in this district since the United States entered the war.”).
84
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Capitalism against Labor.”90 Indeed, he applauded the convictions for
revealing the intolerance of American officials and institutions and
thereby hastening the revolution. “The more Espionage Acts you pass,
the more the lovers of truth you put in prison,” he predicted, “the nearer
will be the end of poverty, misery, starvation, autocracy, despotism and
tyranny.”91
Clayton made clear his view that the defendants “deserve[d]” their
harsh sentences.92 Still, he thought it possible that if they “behave[d]
themselves” there might be “Executive intervention at Washington, and
then deportation following Executive intervention.”93 In the end, that is
precisely what happened, though without the good behavior. Pending
appeal, Weinberger raised and posted bail for the defendants
(poignantly, he paid in Liberty Bonds).94 True to form, the defendants
devoted the months before their prison terms commenced to radical
agitation.95
II. THE RED SCARE REINVENTION OF RIGHTS
Well before the Abrams case arrived in the Supreme Court, Harry
Weinberger was actively framing its narrative. And in the estimation of
the Political Prisoners Defense and Relief Committee, he “succeeded in
giving their case a national, and even international, significance.”96 In
part, he sought to deploy the conviction in his longstanding campaign to
establish that “[t]he right to speak and the right to publish and distribute
pamphlets on the war is an absolute one under the constitution.”97 Legal
vindication of that theory, however, was only one component of the
struggle. Weinberger had long thought “fine spun legal argument on the
Espionage Bill” to be less important than “re-educat[ing] the people.”98

90

POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 30.
Id.
92 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 243.
93 Id. at 244.
94 Doubly Liberty Bonds, N.Y. WORLD, Nov. 16, 1918.
95 See POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 177–78. The defendants were subject to extensive
surveillance while they were out on bail, and Steimer repeatedly clashed with law
enforcement. See id. at 177–88. Abrams and Lachowsky attempted to leave the country
after the Supreme Court issued its decision but were apprehended in New Orleans
aboard a ship bound for Mexico. Id. at 242–46. Steimer, who in any case opposed bail
jumping, was in jail at the time for a subsequent offense. Id. at 247.
96 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 8.
97 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger Baldwin (Apr. 28, 1917), in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, at vol 35.
98 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Joy Young (May 2, 1917), in ACLU Papers, supra
note 31, at vol. 35.
91
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In that broader effort, legal defeats were every bit as instructive as legal
victories.99
Indeed, by the time Judge Clayton dispensed the sentences in
United States v. Abrams, prominent legal defeats like the Masses case had
begun to chip away at the complacency about wartime repression that
had characterized the first year of the war. Early on, most Americans
had either actively embraced wartime censorship as a cost of a
successful war effort or had accepted it as a concession to majoritarian
democracy. Conservatives had always allowed for a great deal of
censorship in the service of public safety and morals; liberty of speech,
they insisted, did not encompass license.100 Progressives, meanwhile,
considered open debate to be essential to social and scientific progress,
but they counseled deference to democratically enacted laws, and they
were willing to suspend the enjoyment of individual rights for the
duration of the war. As Karl Llewellyn put the point in reflecting on the
Abrams case, “[o]ne is willing to endure silence, as he is to suffer taxes
or the reek and mud of the field, that war may pass and victory be
gained.”101
These positions were closely linked to the respective contingents’
attitudes toward the judiciary and judicial review. Conservatives
venerated the courts as the “citadel of civil liberty,” by which they meant
the institution best equipped to insulate the rights of private property
against populist redistribution.102 At the same time, although they
accepted that other individual rights were also essential to the
constitutional design, they were concerned with preserving law and
order and believed that radical agitation crossed the line.103 For their
part, progressives were deeply skeptical of the courts and of the
constitutional rights they purported to enforce. After all, the courts had

99 The NLCB had voiced precisely that sentiment in an early pamphlet. National Civil
Liberties Bureau, The Need of a National Defense Fund (Nov. 15, 1917), in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, at vol. 25 (noting that judicial defeats could “show up miscarriage of
justice” and thereby stimulate change).
100 See, e.g., Editorials: Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech, 5 VA. L. REG. N.S. 712,
715–16 (1920) (“‘Freedom of speech’ as contemplated by our Constitution was no more
intended to allow ‘unlicensed speech’ than the clause which permitted every citizen to
bear arms was intended to allow the carrying of concealed weapons.”).
101 K.N.L., Free Speech in Time of Peace, 29 YALE L.J. 337, 340 (1920).
102 Walter George Smith, Civil Liberty in America, Address by Walter George Smith, 4
A.B.A. J. 551, 562 (1918).
103 On the conservative civil liberties movement during the 1910s and 1920s, see
GRABER, supra note 8, at 19–46. See also DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER:
DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 3–7 (2011); KENNETH I. KERSCH,
CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–2, 11–17, 21 (2004).
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invoked the Constitution to invalidate many of progressives’ most
celebrated legislative accomplishments, from workers’ compensation to
the minimum wage.104 The same month that Harry Weinberger argued
the Selective Draft Law Cases before the Supreme Court, a decision in a
high profile labor case prompted the progressive New Republic to reflect
that “a majority of the Supreme Court are endeavoring to enforce their
own reactionary views of public policy, in direct opposition to the more
enlightened views prevailing in legislatures and among the public.”105
As a radical individualist who defended anarchists, Weinberger’s
beliefs aligned almost as awkwardly with progressives’ views as they
did with conservatives’ views. Over the course of the war, however,
progressives began to reevaluate their position on free speech and
eventually even constitutional rights, if not the judiciary as an
institution. The trajectory is neatly captured by the ruminations of the
philosopher John Dewey in the New Republic.106 In September 1917, he
denied the prospect of widespread suppression and relished the irony
of “ultra-socialists rallying to the . . . sanctity of individual rights and
constitutional guaranties.”107 Two months later, as the scope of
government repression became increasingly indisputable, Dewey
revised his position. He declined to embrace individual autonomy, but
he endorsed wartime tolerance by reference to pluralism and the social
good.108 Zechariah Chafee Jr. would make much the same move in the
spring of 1919 in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, in an article that
famously influenced Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United
States.109

104 On progressives’ hostility toward the courts and rights-based constitutionalism,
see, for example, ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 3–5 (1994); WILLIAM
E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 2, 8 (1991); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 4–6 (1992); WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 1–2, 12–21 (1994); Laura Kalman, In Defense of
Progressive Legal Historiography, 36 L. & HIST. REV. 1021, 1021, 1024, 1032, 1034 (2018);
Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113, 114, 117, 126
(1982).
105 Breaking the Labor Truce, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 1917, at 197 (discussing
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917)).
106 On Dewey’s about-face, see GRABER, supra note 8, at 98; KENNEDY, supra note 28,
at 50–53, 90–92; RABBAN, supra note 8, at 243–45; and ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 202–12 (1991).
107 John Dewey, Conscription of Thought, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1917, at 128–30.
108 John Dewey, In Explanation of Our Lapse, NEW REPUBLIC , Nov. 3, 1917, at 17–18.
109 See Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 937
(1919).
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Chafee’s may have been the most sustained and significant defense
of free speech in the months before Abrams was decided, but its
sentiment found considerable company among Holmes’s admirers and
interlocutors.110 The impetus for a broad-based reconsideration of
progressive attitudes was the persistence of censorship after the war
ended. In November 1918, just weeks after the Abrams trial concluded,
the armistice halted the fighting in Europe. It did not, however, ease
domestic repression. Instead, the coercive apparatus of the state
retrained explicitly on the radicals and revolutionaries who had always
been its most frequent targets.111 The reorientation began even before
the cessation of hostilities. In October, Congress modified existing
immigration laws to authorize the removal of any alien who was
discovered to have espoused anarchist views at any time since entering
the country.112 With the armistice, the Selective Service and Sedition
acts elapsed, but a few pending prosecutions under the Espionage Act
continued, and efforts to repeal the statute were unsuccessful.113
To win the “war to end all wars,” progressives had seen the
suspension of free speech as a worthwhile tradeoff. It helped that
industry, too, was asked to sacrifice for the nation’s cause—that
business leaders feebly complained that their own “civil liberty” was
under assault.114 With the armistice, that precarious equilibrium was
unsettled. Wilson had “unshackled” industry, Gilbert Roe reflected in
December, “but the embargo on ideas remain[ed].”115 In short, the
wartime exigencies that so impressed Justice Holmes when Schenck v.
United States was argued in January, and which he would stress in his
March 1919 decision, were becoming increasingly remote.116

110 For Holmes’s conversations and correspondence with Chafee, Learned Hand,
Howard Laski, and Felix Frankfurter, among others, see RABBAN, supra note 8,
at 299–353; HEALY, supra note 26; STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN
WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 365–95 (2019).
111 See generally ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919–1920
(1955).
112 See Immigration Act of 1918, ch. 186, 39 Stat. 889.
113 Gilbert E. Roe, Repeal the Espionage Law: An Address Delivered Before the Civic
Club of New York (December 3, 1918), in DIAL, Jan. 11, 1919, at 8, 10 (“Who, when
exercising arbitrary power, ever proposes to repeal the law which silences criticism of
the manner in which such power is exercised?”).
114 See, e.g., Walter George Smith, Civil Liberty in America, 41 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 209,
218–20 (1918).
115 Roe, supra note 113, at 8.
116 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“When a nation is at war, many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured
so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right.”).
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To be sure, there were salient differences between the progressive
defense of free speech and the alternative preferred by Weinberger and
his clients. The latter imagined unfettered speech as a pathway to
radical social and economic transformation; the former considered it
the best tool for preventing revolution. The Nation was typical in
blaming censorship for “turning the thoughtful working people of the
country into dangerous radicals and extreme direct actionists.” 117
Stressing the editors’ rejection of socialism, the journal endorsed an
individual’s “right to present for public consideration his ideas, no
matter how erroneous they may appear.”118 By the same token, Karl
Llewellyn cautioned that “[r]epression of expression has in the past
meant disorder,” and that “stern repression, long-continued, has meant
revolution.”119 Even President Wilson professed always to have
“believe[d] that the greatest freedom of speech was the greatest
safety.”120 Whatever his own beliefs, Weinberger played to this concern
in his brief to the Supreme Court. The suppression of truthful
discussion, he warned, would “only drive people to underground
propaganda.”121
The notion that free speech might defuse radical pressures became
an increasingly common trope as mounting labor unrest coupled with
the specter of revolutionary violence abroad raised new concerns about
domestic militancy. During the war, the American Federation of Labor
(AFL) (in contrast to the more radical contingents of the American labor
movement) had experienced a boom in membership and, in light of
labor shortages resulting from foreign deployment of American troops,
in political and economic power.122 In November 1918, however,
Republicans took control of both chambers of Congress, and the Wilson
administration shifted its favor from labor to industry. Soldiers
returned to work, and the corresponding labor surplus spurred unions
to adopt more aggressive tactics. Increased cost of living exacerbated
117

Danger Ahead, NATION, Feb. 8, 1919, at 186.
Id. at 186–877.
119 K.N.L., supra note 101, at 343.
120 WOODROW WILSON, America Is Ready, in THE TRIUMPH OF IDEALS: SPEECHES, MESSAGES
AND ADDRESSES MADE BY THE PRESIDENT BETWEEN FEBRUARY 24, 1919, AND JULY 8, 1919 70, 78
(1919).
121 Brief for Plaintiffs-in-Error at 24, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(No. 316).
122 See JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, LABOR’S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1912–1921 174 (1997). On the
labor-friendly agenda of the National War Labor Board, see MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE
& LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 72 (1994); see also DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE
OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865–1925 442–46
(1987).
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complaints about economic inequality. Anti-immigrant sentiment
escalated, and race riots roiled the nation.123
Most pertinent for the Abrams defendants, concerns about
anarchist violence—as well as public support for suppression—reached
a fever pitch in the spring of 1919 when bombs were mailed to public
officials and other prominent figures.124 The radical press denied
responsibility, but a leaflet found on the scene was signed “The
Anarchist Fighters.”125 The new General Intelligence Division of the
Bureau of Investigation, under the leadership of the young J. Edgar
Hoover, undertook aggressive surveillance of suspected subversives.126
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, who had been targeted in the
second series of bombings, took full advantage of his power under the
new immigration laws to deport foreign-born radicals, including Emma
Goldman and Alexander Berkman, along with Samuel Lipman’s
“sweetheart.”127
Congress, too, played its part. The Senate’s Overman Committee,
initially appointed to investigate pro-German activity among beer
brewers, quickly shifted its focus to the Bolshevik threat.128 Its June
1919 report unselfconsciously denounced Bolshevism for abrogating
freedom of speech and for erecting a “dictatorship of [a] small
minority.”129 Majoritarian repression, by contrast, posed no apparent
threat to democracy. Indeed, New York’s Joint Committee to Investigate
Seditious Activities, or Lusk Committee, convened in March for the
express purpose of “repression carried on by and with the consent of
the vast majority.”130 Under the guidance of well-known lawyer and
Red-hunter Archibald Stevenson, who had also testified before the
Overman Committee, the Lusk Committee would soon assemble
comprehensive reports on the Abrams defendants.131
Notably,
123

MONTGOMERY, supra note 122, at 388–89.
See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 78–80.
125 See PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 137–38 (1991).
126 See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 77–80, 193–200; see also STANLEY COBEN, A. MITCHELL
PALMER: POLITICIAN 215–21 (1963).
127 3 Russians on Way to Prison Under Gag Act, N.Y. CALL, Dec. 27, 1919 (referring to
Ethel Bernstein).
128 See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 226–29. On the Overman Committee, see REGIN
SCHMIDT, RED SCARE: FBI AND THE ORIGINS OF ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES,
1919–1943 136–46 (2000).
129 BREWING AND LIQUOR INTERESTS AND GERMAN AND BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA, S. DOC. NO. 6662, at 31, 36 (1919).
130 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 170. On New York’s Lusk Committee, see TODD J.
PFANNESTIEL, RETHINKING THE RED SCARE: THE LUSK COMMITTEE AND NEW YORK’S CRUSADE
AGAINST RADICALISM, 1919–1923 (2003).
131 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 171–72.
124

WEINRIB (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

10/13/2020 9:29 PM

POWER AND PREMISES

81

Stevenson believed the greatest danger to American institutions came
from “those quasi-political and economic organizations which teach that
the workers should organize into revolutionary industrial unions for the
purpose of using the coercive power of the general strike as a means to
enable an organized minority . . . to impose its will upon the American
people.” 132
Stevenson’s preoccupation with the general strike—the same
method that the Abrams defendants had pressed in their pamphlets—
was not entirely outlandish. The Seattle General Strike of February
1919 prompted frenzied denunciations of worker radicalism and its
threat to political and economic stability.133 It was followed in the
summer and the fall by a massive strike wave involving four million
American workers, including the Boston police.134 The AFL, which had
largely capitulated to wartime censorship of antiwar speech, “insist[ed]
that all restrictions of freedom of speech, press, public assembly,
association and travel be completely removed.”135 But its decades-old
effort to recast picketing and boycotts as constitutionally protected
expression continued to ring hollow.136 Federal troops helped to
suppress the steel strike, and the administration obtained a federal
injunction against striking coal miners.137 Rather than take seriously
their efforts to bargain for better wages, hours, and working conditions,
employers and the mainstream newspapers denounced the strikers as
a mix of foreign-born Bolsheviks and their unwitting dupes.138 The same
progressives who had accepted enforced conformity as the price of
defeating the Kaiser doubted the veracity of the Bolshevik threat.
Strikers’ revolutionary ambitions struck them as a pretext as opposed
to a legitimate peril. As Swinburne Hale observed for the New Republic,
officials who claimed to be policing “force and violence” were in fact
arresting prospective strikers because “they advocated the general
strike.”139
132 Archibald E. Stevenson, The World War and Freedom of Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
1921, at 33 (reviewing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920)).
133 Id. On the Seattle general strike see ROBERT L. FRIEDHEM, THE SEATTLE GENERAL STRIKE
(1964).
134 DUBOFSKY, supra note 122, at 76–79.
135 Resolution No. 108 Adopted by the Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention of the
American Federation of Labor, Atlantic City, June 1919, in ACLU Papers, supra note 31,
at vol. 69. On the AFL, free speech, and anti-Communism during World War I and the
Red Scare, see JENNIFER LUFF, COMMONSENSE ANTICOMMUNISM: LABOR AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 46–80 (2012).
136 See generally Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
137 See DAVID BRODY, LABOR IN CRISIS: THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1919 60–77 (1965).
138 MURRAY, supra note 111, at 135–65.
139 Swinburn Hale, The Force and Violence Joker, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 21, 1920, at 231.
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Such were the conditions when Harry Weinberger appeared in
Washington at the end of October for oral argument in Abrams v. United
States, and when the Supreme Court issued its decision just three weeks
later. Weinberger pressed essentially the same arguments he had
introduced at the trial: the evidence of unlawful activity was insufficient,
and the relevant provisions of the Espionage Act were, in any case,
unconstitutional.
His brief conceded that the leaflets were
“intemperate” and “inflammatory.”140 Those were incautious adjectives,
given Justice Holmes’s propensity for fire metaphors in wartime speech
cases. But the thrust of the argument was straightforward. The
defendants had engaged in a “public discussion of a public policy in
reference to a country with which we were not at war.”141 Under the
circumstances, conviction was unwarranted under the wartime
legislation and incompatible with the protections of the First
Amendment.
Both the majority opinion and Justice Holmes’s storied dissent,
joined by Justice Brandeis, are discussed at length elsewhere in this
symposium and an impressive body of prior scholarship. A few points
nonetheless bear emphasis. First, the majority opinion devoted little
attention to the defendants’ constitutional claims, which were argued
(in the Court’s assessment) “somewhat faintly” and which were
“definitively negatived” in the Court’s recent decisions.142 Second,
because the sentences might have been lawfully imposed under any
count of the indictment, the majority had only to find the evidence
sufficient to sustain any one of the four counts.143 Accordingly, it did not
need to resolve whether a “technical distinction” might be made
between disloyal and abusive language directed to the “form of our
government” as opposed to government officials.144 That the two had
been conflated was a central contention at trial and on appeal. As
anarchists, Abrams, Steimer, and Lachowsky surely rejected the
American form of government, but the printed pamphlets (in contrast
to other materials found among the defendants’ belongings) did not say
so. Lipman testified that as a socialist, he “believe[d] in government,”
140 Brief for Plaintiffs-in-Error, supra note 121, at 19. Holmes’s references to fire
include Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection
of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater . . . .”); and
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (“[I]t is impossible to say that it
might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little
breath would be enough to kindle a flame . . . .”).
141 Brief for Plaintiffs-in-Error, supra note 121, at 19.
142 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618–19 (1919).
143 Id. at 619.
144 Id. at 623–24.
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albeit the “proper,” “not capitalistic” kind.145 The defendants stressed
repeatedly that the pamphlets denounced the president and his policies,
not American democracy. Concededly, the pamphlets also criticized
American capitalism—but that, as Zechariah Chafee observed, was an
economic rather than “political structure.”146 As Kate Claghorn reflected
in the Survey, equating an attack on capitalism with an attack on the
American government “might be giving comfort to those who claim that
the government and capitalism are one and the same thing.”147
Whatever the majority might have made of these arguments, it did
not decide whether the first two counts were sufficiently substantiated,
nor whether the sections of the Sedition Act on which they relied were
constitutional. Instead, it decided only that there was ample evidence
under the third and fourth counts. The defendants sought change not
“by candid discussion” but by “bringing upon the country the paralysis
of a general strike, thereby arresting the production of all munitions and
other things essential to the conduct of the war.”148 In the Court’s view,
the “manifest purpose” of the pamphlets was to “defeat the war plans of
the Government of the United States.”149
It was with reference to these counts that Justice Holmes
articulated in dissent his distinctive view of the intent required by the
statute: “[W]hen words are used exactly,” as he concluded was true of
the Sedition Act, “a deed is not done with intent to produce a
consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the deed.”150 That is,
“the aim to produce it” must be “the proximate motive of the specific
act.”151 Holmes did not believe that Lipman’s English pamphlet, with its
explicit disdain for German militarism, manifested any such purpose.
Schwartz’s Yiddish leaflet, “if published for the purposes alleged in the
fourth count,” could conceivably be punishable.152 It was not enough,
however, to point to isolated phrases, divorced from their broader
context. Taken as a whole, Holmes concluded that “the only object of the

145 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 201; see also id. (“The entire leaflet speaks
about capitalism and not government.”).
146 Chafee, supra note 5, at 753. Chafee added that “our political structure . . . is
compatible with other types of economic organization, such as national ownership of all
industries.” Id.
147 Kate Holladay Claghorn, Reassurance from the Supreme Court, SURVEY, Nov. 22,
1919, at 148.
148 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 622 (1919).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
151 Id.
152 Id. at 628.
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paper [was] to help Russia and stop American intervention there,” not
to impede the war against Germany.153
As for the third count, the Sedition Act made it unlawful to “publish
any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the
United States,” and Holmes interpreted the statute to require “some
forcible act of opposition to some proceeding of the United States in
pursuance of the war.”154 Against that standard, he deemed the
requisite specific intent to be lacking. Even if he was “technically
wrong,” he continued, “the most nominal punishment seems to me all
that could possibly inflicted.”155 Anything else would amount to
punishment for “the creed that they avow[ed].”156 And that, as Holmes
went on to express so eloquently, would be inconsistent with “the
theory of our Constitution.”157
III. FRAMING THE ABRAMS DISSENT
Commentators were quick to label Holmes’s dissent a classic.158 Its
memorable last paragraphs captured as only Holmes could the value of
expressive freedom and the corresponding cost of censorship.159
“Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical,” Holmes famously began. “If you have no doubt of your premises
or your power, and want a certain result with all your heart, you
naturally express your wishes in law, and sweep away all opposition.”160
Given the urgency of the war effort, it was no wonder that public officials
and popular opinion had formed a phalanx of suppression. But Holmes
did not stop there. “[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths,” he continued, “they may come to believe even more than
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.”161 Even such critics of the
153

Id. at 629.
Abrams, 205 U.S. at 617, 629.
155 Id. at 629.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 630.
158 E.g., The Call to Toleration, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1919, at 360. Notably, Holmes’s
dissent in Lochner had failed to persuade a Supreme Court majority over the ensuing
decades. Progressives had reason to believe the Abrams dissent would suffer the same
fate, even as it influenced debate among scholars and policymakers.
159 Abrams, 205 U.S. at 630.
160 Id.
161 Id.
154
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opinion as the antitrust attorney Henry Taft (brother of William Howard
Taft) disdainfully acknowledged that Holmes’s “eloquent and inspiring,
if irrelevant, discourse on the Freedom of Speech” had assumed
“epochal importance.”162
Yet the meaning of the opinion as a matter of constitutional law was
undeniably murky. Most legal scholars found both the majority and
dissenting opinions to be ambiguous and the relationship between the
two downright bewildering. Thomas F. Carroll argued in the
Georgetown Law Journal that “the real issue was concerned with the
meaning of the word ‘intent,’” and “that the opinion of the Court in
Espionage Act cases only indirectly involved the constitutionality of the
Espionage Act.”163 To the extent the case involved the First Amendment
at all, it seemed to “turn[] more upon the limitations of judicial
legislation (by the process of construing) than upon the limitations on
legislation by Congress.”164 That is, even if Holmes believed that
constitutional law and policy should guide judicial interpretation of the
Espionage Act, few imagined that he had erected the First Amendment
as a barrier to congressional oversight in the domain of subversive
speech.
Assessments of Abrams in the law reviews were notable for their
uncertainty. Writing in the Yale Law Journal, Karl Llewellyn concluded
that the majority had avoided passing on the constitutionality of the
Sedition Act. Given that Justice Clarke “neither agree[d] nor disagree[d]
with the view of the First Amendment so cogently put forward in the
dissent,” Llewellyn thought it possible (if not necessarily likely) that the
case would someday “be explained as a mere disagreement on the
interpretation of the particular facts involved.”165 In the Michigan Law
Review, Thomas Reed Powell considered the dissent to be “difficult to
deal with from the standpoint of constitutional law, as it does not make

162 Henry W. Taft, Freedom of Speech and Espionage Act, 55 AM. L. REV. 695, 707
(1921); see also Editorials: Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech, 5 VA. L. REG. 712,
715–16 (1920) (“We regret to see that Judge Holmes dissented, though not surprised to
find that Judge Brandeis did. . . . But Judge Holmes’ language in his dissenting opinion is
so beautifully characteristic and eminently Bostonian that we are willing to allow him
the greatest latitude.”).
163 Thomas F. Carroll, Evolution of the Theory of Freedom of Speech and of the Press,
11 GEO. L. J. 27, 41 (1922–1923). Writing three years after the decisions, Carroll
concluded that “if Justice Holmes’ opinion were accepted, legislative discretion would
be further curtailed in this respect by the Court than has been the case in previous
instances.” Id.
164 L.G.C., Comment on Recent Cases, 14 ILL. L. R. 598, 605 (1919–1920).
165 K.N.L., supra note 101, at 342–43.
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clear how much it is based on the Constitution.”166 And John Wigmore,
in a notoriously scathing critique of Holmes’s opinion, deemed its
reasoning “so unclear that its exact point is difficult to gather.”167
These ambivalent assessments of Justice Holmes’s reasoning raise
the question of why the opinion was so widely celebrated. It is my view
that the dissent was influential not despite but because of its ambiguous
constitutional analysis. Because the majority did not rely on the
Sedition Act’s categorical prohibitions on abusing the form of
Government of the United States, neither the majority nor the dissent
were forced to deal squarely with the constitutionality of those
clauses.168 To Zechariah Chafee, the situation presented was precisely
the one that Judge Hand had confronted in Masses Publishing Co. v.
Patten. “It is not a question of judicial refusal to enforce legislation,”
Chafee reasoned, “but of giving it a construction which will not limit
discussion beyond the express terms of the Act.”169 This posture meant
that progressives could endorse the dissent in Abrams without
confronting whether a reversal was constitutionally compelled, or even
more controversially, whether it was appropriate for the Court to
invalidate democratically enacted legislation. As a result, enthusiastic
support for Justice Holmes’s appeal to toleration masked deep-seated
disagreement among supporters about constitutionalism and the
courts.
The Abrams dissent was an opinion written in and for its moment.
It coincided with an erosion of progressive confidence in administrative
expertise and the judgment of legislative majorities.170 Many of
Holmes’s longtime admirers felt that the Supreme Court’s unanimous
decisions in the spring 1919 Espionage Act cases had failed to account
for the pathologies of majoritarian democracy and the dangers of

166 Thomas R. Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919–1920, 19 MICH. L. REV. 283, 291
(1921).
167 John H. Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in
War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. R. 539, 545 (1920).
168 Zechariah Chafee grasped this point and wrote that “the court did not have to
declare the clauses involved in the third and fourth counts void.” Chafee, supra note 5,
at 770. In fact, he presumed that “they are constitutional when construed in accordance
with the First Amendment.” Id.
169 Id.
170 On contemporary attitudes toward administrative power in the aftermath of
World War I, see DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014); Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter,
and the American Rechtstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 171 (2009). I explore the relationship between the erosion of progressive
confidence in the administrative state and the emergence of free speech
constitutionalism in Weinrib, supra note 27.
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unbridled administrative discretion. It was not that they doubted the
legitimacy of state power, as their conservative counterparts did. On the
contrary, they believed that the increasing complexities of modern
society required careful coordination by a robust administrative state.
But, like Chafee, they came to see free speech as a necessary prerequisite
for its prudent exercise. The Abrams dissent gave voice to their renewed
enthusiasm for open discussion. At the same time, it was suitably vague
about the role of the Constitution in constraining state power and, in
turn, about the role of the courts in enforcing constitutional limitations.
It was surely relevant both to Holmes’s analysis and to the popular
reception of the case that the majority sustained the defendants’
conviction for advocacy of a general strike at a time when progressives
were roundly condemning the deployment of government power to
suppress the steel and coal strikes. That issue took on increasing
urgency in progressive circles during the fall of 1919. In reporting on
the coal and steel strikes, most progressive outlets were more
sympathetic to the unions than toward the government officials who
intervened on behalf of employers.171 Many considered the inequality
of bargaining power between employees and employers to be
incompatible with democracy and inconsistent with good economic
policy. They were also deeply skeptical of the claims that Bolsheviks
were behind the strikes.172
The link to Abrams was apparent. The dominant reading of the
Court’s decision, as one law bulletin put it, was that “urg[ing]
curtailment of production . . . was the only one of the four counts upon
which Justice Clarke for the majority seriously attempted to justify the
verdict of the jury.”173 Abrams was the Court’s first encounter with the
curtailment clause of the Sedition Act. As a general matter, Clarke was
relatively friendly toward organized labor and had evinced support for
the right to picket and strike.174 In Abrams, however, he recognized the
power of government to prohibit a call to strike—at least when that call
was “circulated in the greatest port of our land, . . . in which great
quantities of war supplies of every kind were at the time being
manufactured for transportation overseas.”175
The government had explicitly argued in its brief that the purpose
of the proposed general strike was “not to improve the conditions of the
171

MURRAY, supra note 111, at 140.
Id.
173 Tully Nettleton, The Philosophy of Justice Holmes on Freedom of Speech, 3 SW. POL.
SCI. Q. 287, 291 (1923).
174 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 206.
175 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 622 (1919).
172
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employees either as to wages or hours of labor.”176 Still, the notion that
urging workers to strike, absent what Holmes called a “strict and
accurate” intent thereby to impede the war effort, was understandably
distressing to the labor movement and its allies.177 It was also
inconsistent with Holmes’s approach to labor cases,178 which had
vaulted him to the status of progressive icon well before his dissent in
Lochner v. New York.179 In contrast to most late nineteenth and early
twentieth-century judges, Holmes regarded organized labor as an
acceptable counterweight to capital, and he had famously declined to
impute malicious intent to striking workers.180 “The fact, that the
immediate object of the act by which the benefit to themselves is to be
gained is to injure their antagonist, does not necessarily make it
unlawful,” he had reasoned in his 1896 dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner.181
Not coincidentally, he had also rejected the majority’s assumption that
striking workers necessarily issued “threats of force.”182
Much of the early commentary on Abrams made the strike issue
central. Writing in the April 1920 Harvard Law Review, Chafee observed
that “[s]trikes are not ordinarily illegal, and it would be startling if
Congress intended to prohibit all incitement to them in war.”183 Instead,
the “statute confined itself to strikes and similar measures that were
specifically planned to interfere with the war.”184 Holmes’s friend and
correspondent Sir Frederick Pollock similarly stressed this problem. If
intent were not defined narrowly, “every strike of workmen employed
in producing anything of warlike use would be an act of resistance to the
176 Brief on Behalf of the United States at 35–36, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919) (No. 316). The purpose, according to the government, was “generally to
prevent, at a most critical period of the war, the manufacture and shipment of
munitions.” Id.
177 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
178 Holmes later questioned in correspondence whether he was correct to conclude
that evidence on the fourth count was insufficient. POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 241.
179 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); HORWITZ, supra note 104, at 132.
180 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (“Combination on the one side is
patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.”).
181 Id. at 1082.
182 Id. at 1080; see also Nettleton, supra note 173, at 300–01. In Vegelahn, as
presumably in Abrams, Holmes drew on the theory he had outlined in 1894 in Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). See HORWITZ,
supra note 104, at 131–36.
183 Chafee, supra note 5, at 767.
184 Id. “If these defendants were guilty under the fourth count,” he explained, “so was
every other person who advocated curtailment in the production of war essentials, no
matter what his purpose.” Id. at 768. Chafee also argued that the call to a general strike
was formulaic rather than genuine. “We ought to hesitate a long while before we decide
that Congress made such shop-worn exuberance criminal,” he argued. Id. at 758.
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United States,” even if it were motivated by a dispute over wages and
hours.185
Of course, academic discussion of the Abrams dissent was never
limited to the curtailing production count. From the outset, the opinion
was understood as an endorsement of open discussion. As the failed
coal and steel strikes receded from view—and as Holmes and Brandeis
began dissenting in a broader range of speech cases—Holmes’s
celebration of the free trade in ideas became a progressive rallying cry.
In thinking better of his own earlier concessions to repression,
Holmes was by no means aberrational. True, a few lonely voices
worried with progressive John Wigmore that the Court’s “parlor
Bolsheviks” were abetting the circulation of violent propaganda in the
name of “good-natured tolerance”—and indeed, that the risk was higher
in peacetime, as the “forces of impatient fanaticism [were] let loose upon
our constitutional government,” than it had been during the war.186
Conservative lawyers, on the whole, shared Wigmore’s sense that the
Supreme Court majority had helped to hold off a Bolshevik coup. Many
Americans, however, were losing their taste for suppression, and the
Palmer Raids and the deportations that followed unleashed a flood of
critical commentary. In January, the New York Assembly’s refusal to
seat lawfully elected socialists prompted widespread outrage, along
with a public repudiation by Charles Evans Hughes on behalf of the New
York Bar Association.187 The repressive wave in New York lost its
momentum,188 and despite his best efforts, Attorney General Palmer
failed to persuade Congress to enact a federal peacetime sedition law.189
To be sure, anti-Red sentiment persisted, and state legislatures
continued to pass criminal syndicalism and sedition statutes well into
the following year.190 Still, it was clear that the tide had turned. As
Herbert Goodrich observed in an article on the constitutional protection
of free speech, “We no longer jump with apprehension at hearing the

185

Frederick Pollock, Abrams v. United States, 36 L. Q. REV. 334, 336 (1920).
Wigmore, supra note 167, at 560.
187 Albany’s Ousted Socialists, LITERARY DIGEST, Jan. 24, 1920, at 19; BRIEF OF SPECIAL
COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1920). Chafee
wrote that “with Governor Hughes’s letter on the 9th, the ebb set in.” CHAFEE, supra note
132, at 338.
188 See Thomas E. Vadney, The Politics of Repression: A Case Study of the Red Scare in
New York, 49 N.Y. HIST. 56, 71–72 (1968); JULIAN F. JAFFE, CRUSADE AGAINST RADICALISM: NEW
YORK DURING THE RED SCARE 147–50, 239 (1972).
189 JAFFE, supra note 188, at 177; National Civil Liberties Bureau, This Little Story is
Entitled ‘God Bless the Lusk Committee’, Jan. 28, 1920, in Records of the American Civil
Liberties Union, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Penn., Box 1.
190 MURPHY, supra note 8, at 42; see also PRESTON, supra note 32.
186
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word ‘Bolshevist.’”191 In fact, by March 1920, the liberal Republican
Joseph I. France could declare on the Senate floor that in comparison
with the confiscation of property, it is “a worse form of bolshevism
which confiscates real and personal rights.”192
This period witnessed a revival among progressives (who
increasingly were referring to themselves as liberals) of the language of
constitutionalism, layered upon a critique of administrative abuses in
the policing of suspected subversives. In the summer of 1920, Zechariah
Chafee was among the twelve lawyers and legal academics who issued
the influential Report upon the Illegal Practices of the United States
Department of Justice.193 The group, which also included Ernst Freund,
Felix Frankfurter, and Roscoe Pound, condemned the Wilson
administration for its lawless methods and its “continued violation of
[the] Constitution,” including the “[w]holesale arrests both of aliens and
citizens . . . without warrant or any process of law.”194 Although the
report emphasized the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments rather
than the First, Chafee considered the Department of Justice (together
with the Post Office) to be equally accountable for abridging First
Amendment freedoms. Harry Weinberger and other civil liberties
lawyers welcomed the outcry that public accusations by such prominent
figures helped to generate. “The more frequent the disregard of the
Constitution[] . . . displayed by civil and military officials and by the
courts themselves,” pronounced the League for Amnesty of Political
Prisoners (of which Weinberger was a legal advisory board member),
“the more dangerous the sentiment of resentment and lawlessness will
become.”195
The new enthusiasm for constitutional rights did not, however,
translate into a judicial mandate for enforcing them. The Abrams
dissent, along with a handful of speech-protective Espionage Act cases
in the lower courts,196 suggested the potential for courts to constrain
lawless officials. Chafee himself was instrumental in litigating an
important victory in a 1920 deportation case, though the decision was
subsequently overturned on appeal.197 Nonetheless, most progressives
191

Goodrich, supra note 10, at 487.
59 CONG. REC. 4685 (1920) (statement of Joseph I. France).
193 NAT’L. POPULAR GOV’T LEAGUE, TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: REPORT UPON THE ILLEGAL
PRACTICES OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1920).
194 Id. at 3.
195 LEAGUE FOR AMNESTY OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, IS OPINION A CRIME?, in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, vol. 116.
196 See MURPHY, supra note 33, at 179–247.
197 Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D. Mass. 1920). On Colyer v. Skeffington, see
DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 47–50 (1986); Peter
192
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continued to regard the courts with distrust, if not downright disdain.
After all, the Red Scare had only exacerbated their impression that the
courts elevated property rights over personal rights. Judges (as well as
juries) had proven enthusiastic censors in the wartime case. Not only
had they permitted Espionage Act prosecutions to go forward but they
had actively expanded the sweep of the statutes through the doctrines
of “bad tendency” and constructive intent. As Ernst Freund put it, the
locus of decision-making had simply shifted from an “arbitrary
executive” to “arbitrary judicial power.”198
How, then, did progressives imagine that freedom of speech might
be vindicated? Anticipating later calls for constitutionalism outside the
courts, progressives looked to legislators and administrators to exercise
moderation. Even Zechariah Chafee accepted, after Abrams, that trial
judges were inclined to construe sedition statutes in a speech-restrictive
fashion, and the Supreme Court was unlikely to stand in the way. “The
lesson of United States v. Abrams,” he concluded “is that Congress alone
can effectively safeguard minority opinion in times of excitement.”199 It
was up to Congress to “change or abolish the Sedition Act of 1918, so
that in future wars such a trial and such sentences for the intemperate
criticism of questionable official action shall never again occur in these
United States.”200
In short, few progressives imagined that endorsing the Abrams
dissent required accepting a role for court-centered constitutionalism—
and the handful who deemed the issues inseparable opted to reject the
Abrams dissent instead. For example, in reflecting on the Abrams
decision, constitutional scholar Edward Corwin noted that many of the
same scholars who were “endeavoring to-day to elaborate
constitutional restrictions upon Congress’s power over the press” had
previously opposed the judicial enforcement of “constitutional
limitations” on congressional power. In Corwin’s view, the reversal was
ill-advised; “[I]t [was] much more to the point to insist upon the
responsibility of legislators than their lack of power.”201 In a similar
H. Irons, “Fighting Fair”: Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Department of Justice, and the “Trial
at the Harvard Club,” 94 HARV. L. REV. 1205, 1219–28 (1981).
198 Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919,
at 14.
199 Chafee, supra note 5, at 773; see also CHAFEE, supra note 132, at 3–6 (describing
the First Amendment as “an exhortation and a guide for the action of Congress”).
200 Chafee, supra note 5, at 774.
201 Edward S. Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press under the First Amendment: A
Resume, 30 YALE L.J. 48, 55 (1920); see also Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Law in 19191920, 14 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 635, 658 (1920) (“[T]he cause of freedom of speech and press
is largely in the custody of legislative majorities and of juries.”).
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vein, Herbert Goodrich inverted Holmes’s appeal in Abrams to the “free
trade in ideas.” He pointed approvingly to an emerging consensus that
Lochner v. New York was wrongly decided and speculated that a similar
logic would “uphold a law limiting the exercise of [one’s] tongue when
the majority so wills it.”202 In Goodrich’s estimation, the progressive
critique of freedom of contract had prevailed in the marketplace of
ideas. “If unrestricted speech cannot win in the same field,” he said, “we
shall probably have to get along without it.”203
IV. ABRAMS, AMNESTY, AND LEGAL LEGITIMACY
Simply put, in the aftermath of the Abrams dissent, neither lawyers
nor legal scholars pressed Justice Holmes’s opinion into the service of
legal liberalism.204 Progressives on the whole remained skeptical of
court-centered constitutionalism and preferred to constrain
majoritarian overreach and administrative arbitrariness through other
means instead. For their part, the conservatives who valorized the
judiciary as a “citadel of justice” continued to distinguish between
liberty and license, and they assigned subversive advocacy to the
(unprotected) license side of the line.205
That the Abrams dissent was not used to promote the judicial
enforcement of the First Amendment does not, however, mean that it
was not used at all. In winter 1920, West Publishing Company ran an
article entitled “Soviets and Sedition,” in which it reported that the
Abrams case was “interesting and important, not only because of the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, but because of the use which
the radical and revolutionary forces are already making of it in justifying
their propagandism.”206 That “propagandism” took a particular form.
The Abrams dissent was mobilized not to advance the judicial
enforcement of personal and procedural rights but to prove that justice
was unavailable to radical defendants in the courts.

202

Goodrich, supra note 10, at 500.
Id.
204 On the centrality of judicial review to American liberalism, see, e.g., LOUIS HARTZ,
THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 9 (1955); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL
LIBERALISM 20–27 (1996).
205 Calvin Coolidge, A Platform of Business Principles, NATION’S BUSINESS, Dec. 1924,
at 37.
206 Soviets and Sedition, 3 WEST PUB. CO. DOCKET 2207, 2207 (1920); see also C.W.
German, An Unfortunate Dissent, 20 U. MO. BULL. L. SER. 65, 80 (1920) (“[T]he ‘Rebels’ and
‘Revolutionists’ will be quick to seize upon this dissenting opinion and every phrase
therein, and send it out as propaganda to their fellows, thus destroying in large measure
the beneficent result of the conviction of these defendants and the otherwise salutary
effect of the affirmance of that conviction by a majority of this great court.”).
203
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Advocates immediately identified the persuasive potential of the
opinion in pursuit of their preferred remedy for the wartime
suppression, which (in keeping with Progressive Era beliefs about
institutional role) relied on the political branches rather than the courts:
the campaign for a blanket amnesty of the Espionage Act defendants.
Before and even during World War I, civil liberties groups had scored
modest successes through negotiations with progressive officials.207
The amnesty effort, spearheaded by a range of pacifist and radical
organizations, initially had looked similarly promising. The NCLB’s
Roger Baldwin voiced a common sentiment when he speculated that “all
these long sentences are merely paper”—that there would be a “general
amnesty for political prisoners after the war.”208 Even before the
armistice, respected public figures were urging “enlightened humanity”
in the treatment of those imprisoned for criticizing the draft or
American participation in the war.209 When the war ended, advocates
were optimistic.210 Progressive senators proposed a general amnesty
for those convicted during the war by court-martial, pointing to
arbitrariness in sentencing.211
But these early efforts faltered, and a general amnesty for
Espionage and Sedition Act defendants never materialized. Although
President Wilson considered granting a partial amnesty, his advisors
dissuaded him from doing so.212 Attorney General Thomas Gregory and
his successor, A. Mitchell Palmer, each recommended about fifty
commutations, and both were open to leniency in particular cases (a
concession that only confirmed to advocates that “justice in America is
a matter of favor and influence”).213 But in the summer of 1919, when
207 See generally Jeremy Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties
Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (2014); Laura M. Weinrib, Freedom of Conscience in War
Time: World War I and the Limits of Civil Liberties, 65 EMORY L.J. 1051 (2016).
208 Letter from Roger Baldwin to Stella Comyn Ballantine (July 29, 1918), in ACLU
Papers, supra note 31, vol. 26. Baldwin himself was sentenced to one year in prison for
refusal to submit to the draft. COTTRELL, supra note 37, at 83–88.
209 Letter from Upton Sinclair to President Wilson (Oct. 1918), in ACLU Papers, supra
note 31, vol. 50.
210 Capital Looks to Wilson for Repeal of Gag and Amnesty, N.Y. CALL, Feb. 26, 1919, in
ACLU Papers, supra note 31, vol. 53; see also Liberties Bureau Takes Issue with Gregory
(newspaper clipping), in ACLU Papers, supra note 31, vol. 43 (citing President Thomas
Jefferson’s general amnesty for those convicted under the Sedition [Act] of 1798, which
was “a statute far less drastic than the Espionage [A]ct.”).
211 Proposes Amnesty For Army Offenders, N.Y. CALL, Jan. 28, 1919, in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, vol. 41.
212 JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 109–18.
213 Liberties Bureau Takes Issue with Gregory (newspaper clipping), in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, vol. 43. Mollie Steimer repeatedly rejected efforts to obtain a
commutation on this basis. See, e.g., Mollie Steimer Spurns Mercy, N.Y. CALL, Feb. 24, 1921
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President Wilson expressed willingness to pardon “all American citizens
in prison or under arrest on account of anything they have said in speech
or in print concerning their personal opinions,”214 Palmer insisted that
no such cases existed.215
Determined to overcome these setbacks, proponents of a general
amnesty fought even harder to sway public opinion and to persuade
sympathetic officials. In that effort, the Abrams dissent seemed a
promising weapon. Less than two weeks after the decision was handed
down, Weinberger told the ACLU’s Albert DeSilver that “in view of Judge
Holmes’ opinion, . . . every American should understand that Amnesty
should be declared.”216 In fact, he thought “effective work for amnesty
can be swung around this case, as well, if not even better than the Debs
case, because of the outrageous sentence.”217 DeSilver enthusiastically
agreed. “I think that the dissenting opinion in the Abrams case is a
wonder,” he responded. “We are going to put it to some use all right.”218
Two features of Abrams made it especially appealing. The first was
the “ferocious sentences” (as the Nation described them219) that Judge
Clayton meted out. As a general rule, the amnesty campaign emphasized
the “inequalities attending the administration of justice.”220 Disparities
in sentences implied that judges were arbitrary or even vindictive, and
they buttressed the case for executive intervention. In November 1919,
Weinberger wrote to the socialist leader and Presbyterian minister
Norman Thomas, enclosing a copy of a favorable editorial in the
mainstream press. “Americans who run and only read headlines of
plots, bombs, reds, etc., can even understand that these boys ought not
to go to jail for 20 years,”221 he told Thomas. Thomas evidently agreed.
The World Tomorrow, the Christian socialist newspaper that Thomas
edited, soon cited the case as the “clear[est] proof” yet of the

(“If a general amnesty will be given . . . it will be well, of course. If not, I am determined
to serve my term with a smile, and am absolutely opposed to any individual appeals on
my behalf.”).
214 Two Telegrams from Woodrow Wilson to Joseph Patrick Tumulty, Jun. 28, 1919,
in 61 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 351–352 (Arthur S. Link et. al, eds., 1989).
215 Political Prisoners in U.S. Total 1,500, Estimates Bureau, N.Y. TRIB., Apr. 13, 1919.
216 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Albert DeSilver (Nov. 22, 1919), in ACLU papers,
supra note 31, vol. 91.
217 Id.
218 Letter from Albert DeSilver to Harry Weinberger (Dec. 1, 1919), in ACLU papers,
supra note 31, vol. 91.
219 Our Ferocious Sentences, NATION, Nov. 2, 1918, at 504.
220 Editorial, Release Political Prisoners, DIAL, Jan. 11, 1919, at 6.
221 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Norman Thomas (Nov. 26, 1919), in Harry
Weinberger papers, Box 2, Folder 11.
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“breakdown of our so-called democracy” and asked whether “any
sentence under the Czar’s regime was ever more cruel.”222
Second, and relatedly, Weinberger and other advocates of amnesty
underscored the abuses and irregularities that suffused the
investigation and trial.223 They wagered correctly that respectable
Americans would rally to the cause of procedural fairness even if they
were ambivalent about the underlying offenses. That was a lesson that
civil liberties lawyers had internalized during World War I and used to
good effect during the Red Scare.224 After all, “a fair trial in a court of
justice” was a well-established constitutional right.225 Of course,
procedural fairness was insufficient to safeguard radical agitation or
unpopular ideas.226 Still, appeals to rule of law resonated broadly, and
they could buttress support for executive intervention or administrative
tolerance. During the two years between the Supreme Court’s decision
in Abrams and the defendants’ eventual deportation, amnesty
proponents repeatedly justified their efforts by reference to the case. In
the summer of 1920, Wilson challenged amnesty groups to identify a
single citizen who was in prison due to unjustifiable persecution.227 The
ACLU responded in a public letter stating that the Abrams defendants
were serving fifteen- and twenty-year sentences for the distribution of
handbills “which, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice
Holmes, they had as much right to distribute as the Constitution of the
United States.”228
Abrams had appeared in amnesty literature even before the
Supreme Court issued its decision. In a pamphlet entitled “Why Should
There Be an Amnesty,” the NCLB invoked the case as a prime example
of judicial misconduct. “The record of the trial abounds with instances
of the atmosphere of prejudice and rancor that filled the court-room,” it

222

Views and Reviews: America 1620–1920, WORLD TOMORROW, Jan. 1920, at 2.
See, for example, Harry Weinberger to Zechariah Chafee, Feb. 4, 1920 in Zechariah
Chafee Papers, Box 29, Folder 11 (emphasizing “the intolerance of the judge,” the
skewed composition of the jury, and the “third degree”); and Mollie Steimer and 3 Youths
to Be Released, N.Y. CALL, Oct. 16, 1921 (attributing the “particular public attention” the
case received to the severity of the sentences and the “strikingly unjudicial attitude of
the court in imposing them”).
224 WEINRIB, supra note 11, at ch. 3.
225 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1878).
226 On the limits of a civil liberties strategy built around procedural fairness, see
Laura Weinrib, Untangling the Radical Roots of America’s Civil Liberties Settlement:
Causation, Compromise, and the Taming of Free Speech, 18 JERUSALEM R. L. STUD. 88 (2018).
227 FEDERATED PRESS, June 20, 1920 (newspaper clipping), in ACLU papers, supra note
31, vol. 113.
228 Id.
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reported.229 But it was one thing for advocates to describe a trial as
biased, and another to rely on a justice of the United States Supreme
Court. A minority opinion by Justice Holmes was capable of convincing
even “capitalistic newspapers” that an “intolerable injustice” had
occurred.230 However loudly radicals and pacifists might complain of
injustice, their cries echoed faintly in comparison with a reference in
the New York American to “the painful spectacle of four persons
imprisoned practically for life for printing a leaflet which two of the
Justices of the Supreme Court flatly assert they had a perfect legal right
to print.”231 Exploring the plight of “political prisoners” for the Survey in
August 1920, the social worker Loula Lasker cited Abrams as the “case
which has probably been called most forcibly to the attention of the
public.”232
Weinberger’s effort to characterize the trial as incompatible with
the norms of legal legitimacy found its most powerful champion in
Zechariah Chafee, who believed that the Supreme Court’s failure to
reverse the conviction had shifted the responsibilities to the “pardoning
authorities . . . to remedy the injustice.”233
Relying on his
correspondence with Weinberger and on the publicity materials that
Weinberger prepared and supplied, Chafee argued in the Harvard Law
Review that “the whole proceeding, from start to finish, has been a
disgrace to our law.”234 He described the “systematic arrest of civilians
by soldiers on the streets of New York City” as an unprecedented
departure from legal norms.235 Although the witnesses who arrested
and interrogated the defendants denied abuse, Chafee considered the
allegations of brutality, which were “disquietingly specific and sincere,”
to be troubling.236 At trial, Judge Clayton had breached the norms of
judicial neutrality by cross-examining the witnesses and allowing the
jury to convict the defendants “for their Russian sympathies and their
anarchistic views.”237 He had routinely interrupted and ridiculed them
(“[l]egal historians,” Chafee forewarned, “have always taken interest in

229

Why Should There Be an Amnesty, in ACLU Papers, supra note 31, vol. 69.
LEAGUE FOR THE AMNESTY OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, IS OPINION A CRIME?, in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, vol. 116.
231 Id. (quoting Editorial, NEW YORK AMERICAN, Nov. 13, 1919).
232 Loula D. Lasker, America and Her “Political Prisoners,” SURVEY, Aug. 2, 1920, at 578.
233 Chafee, supra note 5, at 774.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 773. On Weinberger’s influence on Chafee, see POLENBERG, supra note 2,
at 272–84; Irons, supra note 197, at 1230–31.
236 CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 761, 773.
237 Id.
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the criminal judge who jests with the lives of men”).238 And the
sentences he handed out were outrageously long. Indeed, they could not
have been longer had the defendants “tie[d] up every munition plant in
the country.”239 Chafee stressed that he had no affinity for the
defendants’ underlying political and economic views. “My sympathies
and all my associations are with the men who save, who manage and
produce,” he later told the Harvard Club. But he wanted his “side to fight
fair,” and he regarded the Abrams prosecution “as a distinctly unfair
piece of fighting.”240
To be sure, Chafee’s account of the trial was not universally
accepted.241 But the article went a long way toward shaping the public
perception of the case. Frederick Pollock drew heavily on Chafee’s
account in describing Abrams as a “singular disregard of judicial fairness
and of the principles of justice,” and he echoed Chafee (and, in turn,
Weinberger) in describing Judge Clayton’s sentences as draconian.242
Other lawyers and scholars followed suit. When a newly organized bar
association committee sought an example of wartime abuses, the ACLU
pointed to Abrams. “I guarantee that that record will shock any openminded lawyer,” Albert DeSilver offered, citing Chafee’s “admirable
analysis of it in the current number of the Law Review.”243 Chafee also
drew the case to the attention of his colleagues at Harvard Law School,
who responded with outrage. Felix Frankfurter had “no hesitation” in
pronouncing it the “most disgraceful record of a criminal case” in the
federal courts that he had ever read.244 Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound
both joined Chafee in signing a petition to President Wilson requesting
amnesty for the defendants.245
In the end, advocates’ efforts to leverage the Abrams case into a
general amnesty were unsuccessful. On the campaign trail in October
1920, Warren G. Harding conveyed that he saw “no essential differences
between ordinary crimes and ordinary criminals on the one hand, and
238

Id. at 762.
Id. at 763.
240 Irons, supra note 197, at 1233.
241 It provoked an attack by Harvard alumni and eventually an inquiry into Chafee’s
academic integrity. See generally Irons, supra note 197, at 1206.
242 Pollock, supra note 185, at 335 (stating that “a similar offence in England . . . would
be imprisonment for six months, or twelve at the outside”). Pollock’s account itself
influenced American opinions. See, e.g., An English Criticism of a Decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States, 92 CENT. L.J. 369 (1921).
243 Letter from Albert DeSilver to Oswald Garrison Villard (May 8, 1920), in ACLU
Papers, supra note 31, vol. 135.
244 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Julian Mack (May 12, 1921), in Zechariah Chafee
Papers, Box 29, Folder 21.
245 Irons, supra note 197, at 1212.
239
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political crimes and political prisoners on the other hand.”246 Harding’s
attorney general was similarly unencouraging in a 1921 address to the
American Bar Association. Pronouncing it “the duty of the minority as
well as the majority to obey the law,” and the responsibility of the
Department of Justice to enforce it, Harry Daugherty enjoined “those
who do not believe in our government and the enforcement of our laws
[to] go to a country which gives them their peculiar liberty.”247
Throughout the 1920s, lawyers and advocates exerted quiet pressure
on Washington and negotiated commutations for a few prisoners at a
time. Only in 1933 did President Franklin D. Roosevelt finally issue a
blanket amnesty of the wartime prisoners.
As for the Abrams defendants, after much wrangling, Weinberger
secured commutations of their sentences in exchange for deportation to
the Soviet Union at their own expense. In that effort, too, the Abrams
dissent proved instrumental. As the Miami Valley Socialist explained,
“The fact that a dissenting opinion was rendered by Justice Holmes
[was] used as the basis for the appeal for executive clemency.”248
Harding agreed to release the defendants in November 1921, one month
before the release of Eugene V. Debs. According to the New York Call, it
was the final chapter of “one of the most celebrated of all the cases
brought under the Espionage Act.”249 It was in Abrams, the Call
reminded readers, that Justices Holmes and Brandeis had first
denounced that “interpretation of justice which deprived the
defendants of their constitutional rights.”250
V. CONCLUSION
Today, Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States is
remembered as a blueprint for the modern First Amendment, a
harbinger of the judicial enforcement of civil liberties. In its day, that
characterization of the opinion would have been baffling. In the 1920s,
organized opposition to the prosecution of political dissenters drew
heavily on Justice Holmes’s dissent in the Abrams case. But the goal of
246 Harding Is Against Amnesty, PHIL. EVENING LEDGER, Oct. 8, 1920, reprinted in LUCY
ROBINS, A DOCUMENTAL STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR AMNESTY 209–10 (1922) (adding that if
there was any difference, it was “the political conspirator who is the greater menace to
the United States”).
247 Harry M. Daugherty, Respect for Law, 44 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 190, 203–04 (1921).
248 Dissenting Opinion Used in Fight for New Steimer Trial, MIAMI VALLEY SOCIALIST, May
14, 1920, in ACLU Papers, supra note 31, vol. 158.
249 Mollie Steimer and 3 Youths to Be Released, N.Y. CALL, Oct. 16, 1921, in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, vol. 177.
250 Orders Issued for Deporting Mollie Steimer, N.Y. CALL, Oct. 21, 1921, in ACLU Papers,
supra note 31, vol. 177.
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that publicity was to discredit the judiciary as an institution, not to
bolster it. In promoting Justice Holmes’s articulation of the procedural
infirmities of the Abrams trial, advocates could not have anticipated that
the dissent would someday be remembered as an emblem of courtcentered constitutionalism.
The point is not that contemporaries failed to appreciate Holmes’s
articulation of the value of free speech. On the contrary, Holmes’s
colorful turns of phrase were accorded pride of place in pamphlets and
editorials, and the fledgling ACLU eagerly incorporated the opinion’s
most memorable paragraph into its new statement of principles.251 Yet
Holmes’s disagreement with the majority was not invoked in support of
a positive program to strengthen judicial review. It was offered instead
as evidence of the “extent of the Courts’ departure from the principle of
civil liberty.”252 Put simply, it was clear after Abrams that “the Supreme
Court [had] gone over to the side of reaction.”253 And the only tenable
solution was to weaken judicial power.
A pair of articles in the New Republic captures this approach well.
Throughout the 1920s, the New Republic adhered to its earlier,
progressive view that the legislature was the institution best suited to
policing the First Amendment. The solution to unjust laws, its editors
insisted, was to repeal them—not to seek their invalidation in the
courts. It was therefore unsurprising when a December article on
Abrams reached two preliminary conclusions about its effects. First, it
presumed that the court had “succeeded in making out of four
unbalanced and incoherent Russians four martyrs in the cause of true
Americanism”; after all, there was no surer way to make martyrs of
agitators than to imprison them for the expression of ideas.254 The
second implication was no less unexpected. With Abrams, the Court had
“shifted to Congress the task of preserving the spirit of the First
Amendment as a living force in American law.”255
The following April, in an article entitled “The Supreme Court vs.
the Supreme Court,” the New Republic once again examined the Abrams
case.256 This time, it juxtaposed the Court’s wartime speech decisions,
which it characterized as cases involving “human rights,” with its
251 Letter from Walter Nelles to Roger Baldwin (Dec. 11, 1919), in ACLU Papers, supra
note 31, at vol. 120.
252 ACLU, THE SUPREME COURT VS. CIVIL LIBERTY 1 (1921), in ACLU Papers, supra note 31,
at vol. 69.
253 Id.
254 Gerard C. Henderson, What is Left of Free Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 1919,
at 52.
255 Id.
256 The Supreme Court vs. the Supreme Court, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 21, 1920, at 235.
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decisions involving “property rights.”257 According to the editors,
reading the two categories of cases together demanded a “consideration
of the safeguards to be imposed upon the extraordinary judicial power
of the Supreme Court.”258 Although they acknowledged that the justices’
views did not line up squarely along the lines of class interest, they
thought it clear that the Court “manifest[s] a different attitude towards
the acquisition and protection of property than towards other aspects
of human liberty.”259 Complications aside, they continued, “No candid
student of Supreme Court decisions can say that some of its members
do not, unconsciously at least, illustrate the economic interpretation of
history.”260 The editors did not offer a solution. They did, however,
question “the wisdom of leaving the ultimate law-making power of the
nation to nine men.”261
That critics of the Court impugned the justices simultaneously “for
sustaining or for overthrowing acts of Congress” was not lost on
conservatives.262 Assessing “the new attack upon the independence of
the judiciary,” the presiding judge of the Kansas Court of Industrial
Relations identified three principal categories of cases “productive of
the present campaign to discredit the courts and to limit their power.”263
Two of those categories—judicial decisions curbing union activity and
invalidating social and economic legislation—involved longstanding
grievances.264 The third was a new addition to “propaganda against the
courts”: “the alleged invasion of free speech and free press by such
decisions as the Abrams case.”265
For the time being, progressives continued to regard the three
faces of judicial malfeasance as intimately related. That was a position
articulated forcefully by Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette, “the
recognized champion of the movement to limit the power of the
courts.”266 A former law partner of the civil liberties lawyer Gilbert Roe,
he was also an outspoken advocate for free speech.267 In fact he was
among the few senators who had opposed the Espionage Act and had
257

Id.
Id.
259 Id. at 238.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 235.
262 Hon. William L. Huggins, The New Attack Upon the Independence of the Judiciary, 5
L. & LABOR 56, 62 (1923).
263 Id.
264 See supra note 104.
265 Huggins, supra note 262, at 62.
266 Id. at 61.
267 RABBAN, supra note 8, at 304–06.
258

WEINRIB (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

10/13/2020 9:29 PM

POWER AND PREMISES

101

pushed to preserve open channels “for free public discussion of
governmental policies” during the war.268 For over a decade, La Follette
had believed that democratic legitimacy required greater popular
oversight of the courts, and he had proposed court-curbing mechanisms
ranging from the recall of judges to a congressional override of Supreme
Court decisions. Speaking to the 1922 annual convention of the
American Federation of Labor, he pointed to a long list of state and
federal cases invalidating progressive reform legislation and
undermining union power.269 But alongside the many judicial decisions
exercising judicial authority to undermine social and economic
progress, La Follette held out Abrams for special reprobation. “To my
mind this case, involving the fundamental right of freedom of speech,
best illustrates the extreme length to which the court is prepared to go
under the influence of its prejudices and passions,” he said.270 After
Abrams, it was time to “face[] the fundamental issue of judicial
usurpation squarely . . . once and for all.”271 Notably, La Follette’s view
found ample support among the champions of free speech. The
organizations that endorsed his proposed constitutional amendment to
abolish judicial review of congressional legislation included the ACLU,
which emphasized in a 1924 statement that “the courts had been as
flagrant violators of civil liberties as the legislative and executive
branches of government.”272
The theory of the First Amendment we now associate with Abrams
v. United States would not take root for at least another decade. The
story of its success is a messy and protracted one. In part, the old
progressive preference for toleration and accommodation in the
political branches seemed increasingly fanciful, and the potential for
administrative overreach increasingly grave. In any case, the selfdescribed “partisans of labor” who spearheaded the interwar civil
liberties movement and founded the ACLU had never trusted the state
as progressives did.273 Their efforts to secure protection for labor’s
rights to picket and boycott would lead them to advocate a strong First
268 Free Speech in Wartime, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917) (statement of Senator Robert
La Follette), in ROBERT C. BYRD ET AL., THE SENATE, 1789–1989 521–24 (Wendy Wolff ed.
1994).
269 Senator Robert M. La Follette, Address at the Forty-First Annual Convention of the
American Federation of Labor (June 14, 1921), in 66 CONG. REC. (June 25, 1922).
270 Id. at 13.
271 Id.
272 ACLU, FREE SPEECH IN 1924: THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION JANUARY
TO DECEMBER 1924 30 (1925).
273 WALTER NELLES, SUGGESTIONS FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES
BUREAU, ACLU Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 120.
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Amendment, and eventually and ambivalently, to seek its enforcement
in the courts.
Along the way, they would forge an unlikely alliance with a cadre
of conservative lawyers.
Already in 1920, a self-described
“Conservative Constitutionalist” writing in praise of the Abrams dissent
deemed it necessary to protect the “free trade in ideas,” lest propaganda
prosper, “false news” go unanswered, and “minorities perish.”274 A few
years later, as labor militancy and radical agitation receded into hazy
memory, his admittedly aberrational assessment would begin to attain
broader purchase. With the specter of revolution safely behind them,
conservatives could embrace Justice Holmes’s proclamation that the
“surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man” posed
little danger to American institutions.275 Free speech came at low cost,
with large potential gains for property rights and judicial legitimacy.
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Abrams v. United
States, and Justice Holmes penned his historic dissent, all of this was in
the future. In 1919, no one envisaged that Holmes would persuade the
Court to extend First Amendment protection to subversive expression.
For the time being, the justices showed no inclination to “doubt either
[their] power or [their] premises.”276 There was little indication that
free speech would become a core constitutional commitment, let alone
a formidable constraint on government authority.
Notably, the New Republic predicted that Justice Holmes’s dissent
in Abrams would “bulk as important in future discussion of the judicial
interpretation of legislation which limits freedom of speech as the same
Justice’s dissenting opinion in the case of Lochner vs. New York did in
relation to judicial interpretation of laws which invoked the police
power.”277 To draw out the parallel, they anticipated that the opinion
would influence scholarly opinion. They thought it would serve as a
rallying cry and a catalyst for public debate. But it would have been
foolish to expect Holmes to sway his fellow justices to protect unfettered
speech, any more than he had convinced them to abandon liberty of
contract. In fact, contemporaries saw the two decisions as sides of the
same coin. As an early comment on the case observed, Abrams
ensconced the Constitution as “an airtight, four-walled compartment

274

George Palmer Garrett, Free Trade in Ideas, 11 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
181, 184–89 (1920).
275 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919), (Holmes, J., dissenting).
276 Id. at 630.
277 The Call to Toleration, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1919, at 360.
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designed to preserve at all costs the status quo economically as well as
politically.”278
That was hardly a path to deliberative freedom. Indeed, the
staunchest interwar advocates of the First Amendment regarded
Abrams as the deathblow to constitutional litigation in pursuit of free
speech. Despite its stirring dissent, the Abrams case had left “the status
of civil liberty hopeless so far as it is the concern of courts of law.”279
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